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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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VOL. XXIII, 2.

WHOLE No. 90.

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## I.—PROBLEMS IN GREEK SYNTAX.

### II.

#### THE ARTICLE.

In its day Middleton's book, 'The Doctrine of the Greek Article', was a wonder for its ample treatment of a minute subject and was playfully cited in somewhat the same tone as the mythical three volumes on *-di -do -dum*. But nowadays grammatical treatises of similar bulk weigh down the domain of language everywhere like the mortgage pillars, of which Solon tells us, and a whole volume would be needed for a mere digest of the 'literature' on the subject of the Greek article. And yet, as we have seen under the head of the articular proper noun,<sup>1</sup> the subject has not been exhausted, and even pressing practical problems have hardly been touched with the tips of the fingers. To be sure, every school grammar teaches the gradual evolution of the article from the demonstrative. Every beginner is warned to expect a different article in Homer from the article as it is found in Attic. Every novice knows the difference between the particular article and the generic. And yet the story is not always taught in the organic way, and the relation of the articular noun to the anarthrous noun is not always brought home to the feeling. With the genesis of the terminations of the noun this essay has nothing to do. To call *-s* in *ἵππο-ς* pronominal may or may not be a rank heresy. This, however, is true: the article is the explicit expression of what lies implicit in the

<sup>1</sup>A. J. P. XXIII 9.

noun; ἵππος is not 'a horse' but 'the horse', and the particular article reinforces whatever it is in the termination that fixes the floating action or quality in an individual.<sup>1</sup> The particular article is felt to be more and more a necessity, and not, as Julius Caesar Scaliger called it, a *flabellum loquacissimae gentis*. But the generic article, the article that picks out an individual and holds it up as a model, a type, a standard, never becomes a necessity, and the differences which the grammars make between abstracts with and without the article not only lack practical warrant in the every-day language, but fail to work in the field in which they are most needed; and he who tries to distinguish between σοφία and ἡ σοφία, ἀρετή and ἡ ἀρετή everywhere in Plato is not wise. The differences that Plato himself makes, Plato himself unmakes. How can we distinguish between οὐσία and ἡ οὐσία when the introduction of an articular infinitive and an oblique case destroys the possibility of distinction? You may say οὐσίας or τῆς οὐσίας, you must say τοῦ εἶναι, you must say τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. Flat and unscientific as it may seem, the addition and the omission of the article are often due to rhythm. Flat and unscientific as it may seem, the addition and the omission of the article are often suggested by nothing more serious than the practical necessity of distinguishing between predicate and subject,<sup>2</sup> or the artistic need of amplitude on the one hand, of condensation on the other.

The oldest use of the article anticipates the youngest, the youngest use is rooted in the oldest, so that the article is alive throughout the whole history of the language. It is the degree

<sup>1</sup>In 1893 I had rashly written 'the swift one', but I have learned to be more cautious. In his recently published work, 'Lectures on the Study of Language' (N. Y., 1902), Professor Oertel says (p. 306): 'To me it would seem much more likely that a sound complex first attached itself to the compound percept of an object, and that only later it came to signify also a prominent element of this compound; so that the Indo-European word for "horse" did not originally mean "swift" and was then used for the "horse", but that it originally meant "horse", and the meaning "swift" was a later development, the quality being expressed by the word for the object which possessed the quality in a marked degree.' And in support of this view he cites a number of authorities. The trouble is that 'horse' in compounds is used in so many ways that the notion 'swift' does not come out inevitably. In popular parlance it is said that a fence ought to be 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight'. Here reference is had to the horse's jumping power, and in most of the compounds with 'horse' far other qualities are prominent than swiftness. No more fascinating field than semantics, none more dangerous.

<sup>2</sup>Plato, Theaet. 188 B: ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης.

of life, the manifestation of life, that interests the student of style; and nothing can bring this life more directly to the consciousness than the comparison of Latin, which has only what we have called the implicit article. It is this absence of the article that gives Latin its lapidary style. This lapidary style the Greek can take on, but it does not continue long in that stay. It is only a temporary pose. Homer is too rich and varied to dispense with the article which abounds in him as a demonstrative and prefigures largely its later use. It is in the higher lyric that the scarceness of the article makes itself felt; for we see that the resources of the later article are at hand and yet remain unused. Here and there the article has an un-Homeric extension, so that we note the conscious abstinence of art and pass almost with a feeling of relief from the rare atmosphere of higher lyric to the lower levels of dramatic dialogue and to the broad campaign of prose; and in certain moods we are ready to welcome the hearty multiplication of the article which is said to have characterized the Doric dialect.<sup>1</sup> We come down from Pindar's Olympian heights, from the lonely crag which the Theban eagle 'clasps with hooked hands' to the meadows in which Aristophanes disports himself, and where the Laconian guests of Lysistrata (1247-1261) foot it so featly. There is no hyperaesthesia here. A little training, and the feeling is soon disciplined, and, once disciplined, becomes an unfailing source of pleasure—in the classic regions. Of course one must pay for it as soon as one comes into the vulgarities of the perpetually articular proper noun. But one accepts vulgarities in certain strata of language as in certain strata of society, with mild resignation.

Among the fellow demonstratives of the article, *οὗτος*, a manner of reduplicated article, is nearest of kin, and stands to the article as the article does to the termination, if, indeed, the termination is a demonstrative. *ὁ, οὗτος* and *ὁς* form a group most closely associated from the beginning of our record, and the familiar shift from one to the other gives an antique coloring to style. 'Them that', 'those that', 'those who', and the provincial 'them as' may serve as illustrations of similar feeling in English. Of this primitive state of things there are traces enough in the standard language; but while the grammars expand on *ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ*, on *τὸ ὅ, τὰ ἃ, πρὸ τοῦ* and the like, one of the most important

<sup>1</sup> Müller, Dor. II, 504, Blaydes on Ar. Lys., 1247. Read Alkman's Partheneion, and comp. A. J. P. XXI 352.

syntactical survivals of the whole group is not emphasized or not emphasized in the right place, and that is the use of *οὗτος* without a conjunction at the head of a sentence. This is not asyndeton. *οὗτος* at the head of a sentence without a conjunction is no more asyndetic than is the relative. *οὗτος* is the universal demonstrative; the others are all particular; it is the regular antecedent of the relative, and with it the relative is 'that'. With the others, *ὃδε* and *ἐκεῖνος*, it is rather 'who' or 'which'. In practical use, *ὃδε* sets up an opposition to *οὗτος*, gets to itself the connotation of the important first person, but it is only in dramatic style that *ὃδε* can make head against *οὗτος*; and it is the large use of *ὃδε* that gives so much of the conversational tone to the discourse of Herodotos. To be sure, *ἐκεῖνος* gives bulk, gives weight, but it lacks precision. It is a 'yon', which is as vague as the next world, to which it is always assigned, and great hulking demonstrative as it is, it needs the guidance of *ὃδε* and *οὗτος*. *οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, ὃδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ*. All these are the commonplaces of grammar. But, of late, scholars have thought it worth while to watch the usage of so familiar a pronoun as *οὗτος* in the Attic orators, and have formulated delicate regularities unformulated before;<sup>1</sup> and a theory as to the composition of the work of Thukydides has been based on the shifting position of *ὃδε*, on *ὁ πόλεμος ὃδε* and *ὃδε ὁ πόλεμος*.<sup>2</sup> 'This' and 'that' in English are not so simple as might be supposed. Foreigners do not always master them perfectly; a German friend of mine always said 'one of those days', and the use of *este* and *ese* is said to be the Spanish shibboleth. No one, however blunt his senses, is indifferent to the final *ι* in *ὅδι* and *οὐτοσί*, and it is not unprofitable to train the perceptions to catch finer differences.

#### THE VERB.

The domain of the voices is variously distributed in various languages, as we have incidentally seen. Active, passive, reflexive are used in differing proportions. In

##### Voices.

French and German the reflexive is much more freely used than in English, which, in its turn, uses the passive with an un-Germanic freedom suggestive of Biblical Latinity, as Biblical Latinity is suggestive of Greek influences. Doubtless

<sup>1</sup> See Blass, *Rh. Mus.*, Vol. XLIV, A. J. P. XI 107.

<sup>2</sup> See Herbst as summarized in A. J. P. I 241.

the predominance of one of these forms of expression over another would be a matter of stylistic interest, but so far, only a few sporadic observations have been made. A digest of the actual usage is still lacking and impressions are not to be trusted. How the elements of active, passive and middle may lie undifferentiated in the same form we can see by the verbal noun, we can see by the so-called active infinitive, we can see by the so-called passive participle in *-τος*.<sup>1</sup> *ἄξιος θαυμάσαι* is the more primitive form, and yields grudgingly to *ἄξιος θαυμασθήναι*. The passive *-τος* sets up active and middle meanings. The finite verb is clearer but not overclear. Our record begins before the voices had clarified themselves, and in fact middle and passive continue throughout the language undifferentiated in the tenses of continuance and completion. It is only in the tense of attainment, where clearness seems to be absolutely necessary, that middle and passive go apart. Even there we find an occasional aorist middle that serves as a passive; and the so-called deponent passives, while ultimately explained as intransitive actives, remind one of the passives which the modern Greek uses as middles, nay, even as direct reflexives.<sup>2</sup> The *-θησομαι* future is late. It is an evolution that may be due to the desire of marking the ingressive, the complexive character of the future more distinctly,<sup>3</sup> and the emergence of the form is an interesting sign of grammatical consciousness such as we see in the persistent spread of such locutions as 'is being built' in English. All such new formations are in a large sense stylistic. We are no longer in an Homeric world, a Pindaric world; we are among the sophists, the sophists on the stage as well as the sophists in the forum. But for most of the phenomena of the voices mentioned in the grammars there is no history given, although there must be a history; there is no stylistic meaning given, though there must be a stylistic meaning. Instead of that we have much discourse about the distinction between transitive and intransitive, a distinction which, from a higher point of view, is futile. Call a verb that has a

<sup>1</sup> C. E. Bishop, Verbals in *-τος* in Sophokles, A. J. P. XIII 171-99; 329-42; 449-62.

<sup>2</sup> For example, *ἐφονεύθη*, 'he killed himself'. Vincent and Dixon (p. 315) cite *ἐσκέφθη*, 'he considered', *ἐστοχάσθη*, 'he perceived', *ἐπλύθη*, 'he washed', *ἐνίφθη*, 'he washed his hands', *ἐκρεμάσθη*, 'he hanged himself', not only 'he was hanged'.

<sup>3</sup> See my Syntax, § 168.

passive a transitive verb, a verb that does not form a passive an intransitive verb. That is well enough. But this passing over to an object business is elusive. Any verb may be transitive to the extent of taking an inner object. Any verb may be intransitive when the object is involved, i. e., when it merely expresses an action. 'Thou shalt not kill' is intransitive. It means 'thou shalt do no murder'. So far theory. But practice is another matter, and habits need watching in English and in Greek. "Only in America, I believe", says Mr. Fitzedward Hall in the Academy, March 25, 1893, "is the verb *empty*, except as meaning 'become empty', any longer intransitive: the humblest rustic in my parish would say, 'the Ore *empties itself* into the Alde.'" I must confess that as an American I am not ashamed of an obsolescence that I share with Sir Thomas Browne, and when Mr. Eugene Field tells us that the intransitive use of 'weary' is wrong,—well, most students of English would prefer the taste of Tennyson to the taste of the Chicago poet. For all that, we should like to know which of the Greeks does these things, which of them uses the language to its legitimate or illegitimate stretch, whether those genial sinners, the poets, or the self-willed Thukydides with his *αὐτόγνωτος ὀργά*, or the *condottiere* Xenophon, *πολυπλάνητος κάρτα* (Hdt. 1, 56), like the Dorians whom he admired so much. *βάλλ'* *ἐς κόρακας* has a common sound, but *εἰσβάλλει* is perfectly acceptable, as acceptable as 'empty' would have been to an American until Mr. Fitzedward Hall uttered his dreadful note of warning.

The moods are the keys of the music of language, and the Latin *modus*, however meant, is a happier name than the Greek

*ἔγκλισις*. Indeed, the moods of the Greek verb  
**Moods.** have a certain analogy with the moods in Greek

music. The direct and manly Dorian reminds one of the indicative, the martial Aeolian of the imperative, the longing Lydian yearns with the optative. It is said of the Fourth Olympian of Pindar that the lively Aeolian mood is tempered by the plaintive Lydian. If so, *θεὸς εὐφρων εἴη λοιπαῖς εὐχαῖς* would correspond to the plaintive Lydian strain, *Οὐλυμπιονίκαν δέκεν Χαρίτων ἔκατι τόνδε κῶμον* to the Aeolian element. But if this especial illustration be fancy, as it is, the general analogy holds good; and like the moods in music, the moods of the verb represent the states of the soul, *τὰς διαθέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς*; and so the English 'mood' gains an additional fitness and is not to be discarded for 'mode', as the

manner of some is. Here, if anywhere else, sympathy is necessary to understanding, and yet we are not to leave everything to sympathy; we are not to renounce definition, to renounce analysis. The transfer of moods from one language to another may be impossible, the transfer of feeling may be made, and analysis may aid in the transfer. It will not do to say that this or that turn makes no difference to us, that to us *ὅπως* and *ὅπως ἂν* are all one.<sup>1</sup> Inasmuch as it must have made a difference to *them*, we must learn to feel after the difference, if haply we may find it. Orderly research has brought many apparent vagaries of language under the dominion of law; and where analysis fails, atmosphere helps. The construction is known by its fellows, by the company it keeps, whether it haunts the courts or wrangles in the mart or hides in the study. It is well to emphasize these principles at this point, for the range of the moods differs so much in different languages, there is so much overlapping, so much crossing that, apart from certain rough and ready criteria, the beginner is tempted to give up the whole domain to the sway of chaos; but Chaos and Old Night are not our rulers and we need not surrender everything to *ἄλογος αἰσθησις*. *Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo investigari possiet.*

In studying the elements of the problems of the moods, we have to consider time as well as feeling. Moods are temporal, tenses are modal. The attitude of mind is largely concerned with that which is not yet, that which is no longer, with the future, with the past. In fact, so much has mood to do with time, that future relations are expressed modally. The Greek future is a mood, the Latin future is a mood, the English future so far as it is differentiated from the present is distinctly modal, is imperative, is optative, that is if 'shall' and 'will' are imperative and optative. The sphere of present and past is occupied by the indicative. The other moods divide out the future. Imperative, subjunctive, optative are all future. *δός, δίδου, δῶ, διδῶ, δοίην, διδοίην, δώσω* are all modal and all future. But present indicative and imperfect indicative may also reach forward, each into its future; the one into the future of the present, the other into the future of the past. There is an expression of will in the conative present, a sigh of failure in the conative imperfect. The imperfect is a suspended future. It

<sup>1</sup> Madvig, § 122, Bei *ὥς* und *ὅπως* bewirkt *ἂν* keine bemerkbare Veränderung der Bedeutung. So Goodwin, M. and T. § 44, 1, N. 2 (O. E.). But see A. J. P. IV (1883), 422, and Goodwin, M. and T. (1889) R. E., § 312, p. 110.



can be interpreted into terms of *ἐμελλον* with the infinitive. It needs no *ἄν* to mark its unreality. Now over this range of the future, the future of the past and the future of the present, the Greek moods undulate with their 'fluid footsteps', but they are no more lawless than the tides. *δώσει, δότω, δοίη, δοίη ἄν* may be used in the same general way, but what a difference of tone, what a difference of sphere. The familiar future, the direct imperative, the implication of order in wish, the courteous or ironical suggestion, how these play up and down over the domain of will.<sup>1</sup> Every novice feels or ought to feel the shifting tone, but the enjoyment is enhanced if one watches the sphere, if one notices that Hesiod who has so much to do with the imperative tempers its austerity with the optative more frequently at least in proportion than any other author, that Pindar shares in this respect what may be called the Delphic sphere of Hesiod, that the Attics abound in the imperative optative with *ἄν*, which shows all its resources of bitterness in the tragic poets, all its resources of fun in Aristophanes, all its resources of urbanity in Plato.<sup>2</sup> How strange it seems when we pass from the optative and *ἄν* of Attic society to the legal optative with *κα* in the dialect of Elis, and find a hint turned into a law.<sup>3</sup> A syntactical journey is a journey like any other from pine to palm, from snow to Sahara.

But it is only in the more elaborate and complex forms of the sentence that the moods display all the subtlety of their usage as it is only in the more elaborate and complex forms of social life that the emotions require alembic and crucible. Outside the compound sentence, subjunctive and optative have a short story. But from the beginning of recorded Greek, we have to do with complex sentences just as in the beginning of Greek history we have to do with a complex society. Neither syntax nor society is primitive in Homer. Even there we are under the dominion of conventions. And so there are conventions in the use of the moods that control the whole range of the language from the beginning of our record. Not that these conventions are in-

<sup>1</sup> Mme. de Beaumont chez de Vogüé, *Heures d'Histoire*, p. 91: *Le style de M. de Chateaubriand me fait éprouver une espèce de frémissement d'amour; il joue du clavecin sur toutes mes fibres.*

<sup>2</sup> On the imperative optative with *ἄν* see now my *S. C. G.* § 394. A fine example of bitterness is *So. El.* 1491 where Orestes says to Aigisthos *χωροῖς ἄν εἶσω*.

<sup>3</sup> See Bergk, *Gr. L.G.* I 110; Cauer<sup>2</sup> No. 259.

organic. They go back to primitive needs, no doubt, just as the two buttons on the back of the modern coat go back to the needs of the ancient swordbelt. They have their inner propriety, no doubt, and being subject to the shifting taste of the time, to the shifting taste of the individual, they serve to show us the form and pressure of the time and the character of the individual. But for all that they tend to mechanical uniformity of practice; they are fashions and like fashions exact a minimum of consciousness from ovine humanity.

To this sphere belong the sequences and it is here that we encounter the problem of the use of subjunctive and optative. From the beginning of our record the subjunctive and the optative have divided the dependent sentences between them. The subjunctive after principal tenses, the optative after historical tenses. That is a convention which may lose its hold but never loses its rights. Nothing could be more unhistorical than the statement that after historical tenses the optative is permissible only, not necessary (A. J. P. V 400). It is the unconventionality of the subjunctive after the historical tenses that gives it the charm of dramatic directness, of what is called *repraesentatio* (A. J. P. VIII 231). If we ask the question how it came about that the subjunctive has associated itself with the principal tenses and the optative with the historical tenses, we ask a question that is not easy of answer. Those who contend that the subjunctive is a mood of will, the optative the mood of wish, see in the will the stronger, more vivid form, that fits it for the practical prospective of the future of the present, whereas the wish seems to them weaker, less vivid than the will and hence better fitted for the future of the past, which is no longer a matter of practical consideration. But there are those who deny that the subjunctive is a mood of the will and the optative a mood of the wish. They are both futures, one more vivid, the other less vivid. But how do they come to be futures? Is not the Greek future indicative that we have modal? Are not 'shall' and 'will' modal? All that we know, all that it is safe to say is this, that a form which elsewhere conveys command associates itself with the principal tenses, that a form which elsewhere conveys a wish associates itself with the historical tenses and that this association, which is suggested by the similarity of the respective terminations, is found from the beginning to be a convention, a rule, a regular sequence. It is a sequence that is seldom violated in Homer,

never violated in Pindar, and unless we appreciate it as a sequence we cannot appreciate the freedom that breaks up the sequence; we cannot appreciate what the French call the inconsequences of the coquette, Language. The audacious substitution at pleasure of the subjunctive for the optative is a revolution like that of the sophists, like that of the *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*, like that of the *droits de l'homme*. If we search the record we can see premonitions of the deliverance just as we can see premonitions of the French revolution; but epic conservatism like political conservatism dies hard. Herodotos, the dramatic, Thukydides, the sophistic lead the way in prose, but Xenophon is not carried wholly away by the mob which he loathes. *Stare super antiquas vias* is a motto which he would have understood. Plato keeps nearer to the older tradition. The prose poet, the idealist, the regenerator of the state, has his point of rest amid the tide of motion, while the orators oscillate to and fro, balancing between *νόμος τύραννος* and *δῆμος τύραννος*. But be it noted that the shift is from optative sequence to subjunctive sequence, that it is all in one direction. It is a revolution that does not go backward. Subjunctive for optative almost, as it would seem, at the sweet will of the speaker, but a shift the other way causes the grammarian to cry out. Aristophanes makes it once or twice and it is resented as a piece of *gaminerie* too outrageous even for that *gamin*.<sup>1</sup> It will not work both ways. It is the subjunctive that encroaches on the optative, not the optative on the subjunctive, just as it is *μή* that encroaches on *οὐ*, not *οὐ* on *μή*. Now this encroachment runs through all the forms of the strictly dependent sentence, relative, temporal, conditional, and belongs therefore to the universal aesthetics of the language. In later Greek the vulgarization, if I may say so, is complete. The optative becomes more and more an artificial form, and its function is restricted to the primal wish. The communism of the New Testament knows scarcely anything of the optative. Form and thought are alike doomed. All the optatives we find in later Greek are artificial and the frantic effort of the Greek Renaissance to keep the old language alive shows how great the dissidence is between the spoken and the written word. The optative is considered elegant—and they wear it in the wrong place. It is a fine thing after a past tense. Why should it not be a fine thing after a principal tense? And so they proceed to use it, and Lucian's

<sup>1</sup> See the commentators on Vesp. 110.

optative for subjunctive has been set down to vividness (see A. J. P. IV 428), whereas it is simply a bit of misapplied finery and reminds one of those who revive the English subjunctive and think that they are elegant when they use 'if I were' where 'if I was' is the only grammatical possibility.

The infinitive is not a mood; though it has been so accounted by ancient grammarians. A verbal noun, it has learned to represent all

the moods, and, as the universal representative, has acquired modal rights. When we first become acquainted with it in Homer, it has learned to represent the indicative, and has taken on, though reluctantly, the negative *οὐ*. In obedience to the necessities of the indicative, it has developed a future, quite needless in its first estate. In fact, it has all the apparatus for *oratio obliqua* which the Greek handles so lightly, the Roman so heavily. But, as the dative of a verbal noun, its natural affinities are with the imperative, and this imperative infinitive has a vigorous life at the beginning of our record (see A. J. P. XIV 124). As prose advances, the imperative infinitive recedes until it finds one last refuge, the conservative pale of legal language. The infinitive of law and decree, of prescription, direction, recipe, the infinitive of Attic decrees and of Xenophon's Hunter's Own Book, is an independent infinitive. No leading verb is necessary. It is simply old-fashioned, like the long imperative in Latin, and suits old-fashioned things like laws, old-fashioned spheres like the sphere of vengence. But as often happens, the dependent sentence retains the original life. The modal future survives in *εἰ* with the future indicative, in the relative with the future indicative; and the imperative infinitive, if banished from the society<sup>1</sup> of the leading clause, is fully alive in dependent discourse. In its dependency on verbs of will and endeavor the supplementary infinitive is still an imperative. It is the imperative of *oratio obliqua*, a fact not sufficiently emphasized in the ordinary grammars, and carries that imperative force even into the relative dependencies. Nay, when the nominal nature of the infinitive resumes its rights and the infinitive is forced back into the ranks of the noun by the article, it does not forget its imperative functions. *περὶ τοῦ μὴ πιστεύειν* = *περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν πιστεύειν*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On fashions in imperative expressions see Kurrelmeyer's interesting treatise, 'The Historical Development of the Types of the First Person Plural Imperative in German.' (J. H. U. Diss.) Strassburg, Trübner, 1900.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Plato, Legg. 862 E: *παράδειγμα τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν* = *τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἀδικεῖν*.

Still the infinitive was doomed. The final sentence encroached more and more on its province, first pure finality, 'in order that', then complementary finality, 'to'. We see *ἵνα*, *ὥς*, *ὅπως* encroaching on the territory that was all the infinitive's own. Even in Homer, even in conservative Pindar, we notice the beginnings of an invasion that was to sweep the infinitive away. *ὅτι* in Homer was a prophecy of what was to come—of the vast inroads on the territory of the *oratio obliqua* infinitive. The seeds of death are the same as the seeds of life. The marvellously mobile noun-verb perished from the face of the language. The Centaur was no more, and well might the modern Greek say: *ἠθελον Χείρωνά κε Φιλυρίδαν ζῶειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον, φῆρ' ἀγρότερον, νοῦν ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον*. It is an enormous, an incalculable loss to any language and changes its whole aspect. It differentiates modern from ancient Greek as much as anything else. This is one of those mutilations to which one may resign oneself; but one cannot kiss a wooden hand though Goetz von Berlichingen may fight valiantly with an iron one.

In my previous paper I had something to say about the participle, which the ancients counted as a distinct part of speech, and was betrayed into some discussion of the negative **The Negatives.** *μή* with the participle. After *μή* had found its way into the logical conditional sentence and the scheme of the conditional was thus completed,<sup>1</sup> *μή* became something more than the negative of the will. We may put *ὁ μὴ συνιείς* (Pind. N. 4, 31) back into *μὴ συνιέτω τις*, but for all that *ὁ μὴ συνιείς* is a substantivizing of *ὅς μὴ συνιῇ* of the old generic relative. But while the participle may do this, the adjective is not ready for it, certainly not the anarthrous adjective, and those who would write *μὴ φίλον* Pind. P. 1, 51 are sinning against the history of the language. Once admitted to the sphere of the participle, then to the sphere of the adjective, the negative *μή* went forth conquering and to conquer. It became the dominant negative of the articular participle, of the articular adjective, and finally usurped a wide domain in the later language. But it is distinctly to be remembered that whenever in the Greek of the good period difficulty arises with the negative, the true appeal is not to the artificial generic but to the natural imperative. Scratch the generic and you will find an imperative, as I have shown. But the shifting use of the negative with the participle

<sup>1</sup> Vierke ap. Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, § 359.

is only one illustration of the importance of the negative particles. For the Greek negatives are eminently things of moods, if not of fancies, if I may adapt Conington's translation of 'varium et mutabile semper'. The modality of *οὐ* and *μή* helps us to understand other modalities as well. If we can bridge the gap between the imperative *μή* and the ideal *μή*, we can bridge the gap between the imperative subjunctive and the futural subjunctive; and the use of *οὐ* with the optative and *ἄν* helps us to understand the optative as a dream that has found an issue, be it gate of ivory or gate of horn, into the realm of reality.

Of the proethnic history of the Greek negatives I have little or nothing to say, for in these papers I do not deal with origins. Not that I underrate the importance of origins. Given the origin, and the multiform manifestations of the one principle are much simplified. But language is an organic growth under conditions, under conventions. We ourselves are the children of conventions and a return to the primitive may shock us. So we feel a decided shock when *οὐ* is combined with an abstract noun, we feel no shock when it is used with an infinitive; and yet there must have been a time when *οὐ διαλῦσαι* would have been as repellent as *οὐ διάλυσις*.<sup>1</sup> A conventional remnant of this repugnance we have in the rule that tells us how the Greek of all periods prefers *οὐ φημι* to *φημι οὐ*, *οὐκ οἶμαι* to *οἶμαι οὐ*, just as the Roman prefers *nego* to *aio non*. But as *οὐ* is very common in *oratio obliqua*, the statement of the grammars has no organic meaning. Let a man, however, read attentively and he will see how seldom the hateful misalliance is suffered in Homer. To *μή* with the infinitive there is not the same repugnance, because the infinitive was used as an imperative before it was used as a representative of the indicative.

The study of origins, the study of comparative grammar, helps us somewhat, as I have said. It is well to know, for instance, that in all likelihood *οὐ* = *haud*, for this identification helps forward the theory of adhaerescence. But the main service of it lies in the check that it gives to the hasty parallelism of *οὐ* with *non* and of *μή* with *ne*, which like most parallelisms between Greek and Latin runs a very little way; and practically the two negatives in Latin are of not much more use to the student of Greek syntax than the two negatives in Hebrew,

<sup>1</sup> See now H. A. Hamilton, *The Negative Compounds in Greek*, p. 31.

an entirely alien tongue. In fact, it is better to dissociate these Greek negative moods, as they may be called, from the Latin phenomena, lest we get into the tangle that has immeshed the treatment of the positive moods.<sup>1</sup> It is better simply to face the fact that the Greek negatives present peculiar problems, problems that demand psychological sympathy as well as historical knowledge for their solution, and even then seem to baffle the most sympathetic and the most learned, so that eminent scholars are not ashamed to enter their *non liquet* against puzzle after puzzle. Of course, certain formulae are on everybody's tongue.  $\sigma\upsilon$  is the negative of statement;  $\mu\eta$  is the negative of will or wish. And there is another formula not so tangible.  $\sigma\upsilon$  belongs to the world of actuality,  $\mu\eta$  to the world of ideality. But these two sets are not to be dissociated, as has been done, openly by some,<sup>2</sup> covertly by others. If we are to have any unity in the treatment, we must recognize the fact that the ideal comes not through vision but through will. 'Bring me up Samuel' is a command that precedes vision. The vision has to be conjured up, and it is a cardinal error to look for the genesis of the  $\mu\eta$  constructions elsewhere than in creative, or rather destructive, force. But the vision itself, as a vision, is actual, and all its negatives are  $\sigma\upsilon$ .<sup>3</sup> How important this distinction is we can see by the negative of the future. Originally modal, the future leads us to expect the negative  $\mu\eta$ . And yet in the simple sentence it refuses to take the negative  $\mu\eta$  except in the question, where any indicative can take it. The future has become a real indicative, and it is only in the dependent sentence that it retains its modal meaning. There is practically no  $\mu\eta$  with the future indicative in an imperative sense.<sup>4</sup> We must use the aorist subjunctive. In the simple sentence,  $\mu\eta$  with the future indicative in an imperative

<sup>1</sup>On *neque* and *neve* see A. J. P. XVIII 123; Giles, Latin Negatives and their Use in Prohibitions, Proc. Cambridge Philol. Soc., 1901, pp. 12-3; W. K. Clement, A. J. P. XXII (1901), p. 90; Lattmann, cited by Golling, Z. 8. G 49, 275.

<sup>2</sup>See A. J. P. XII 520 (cited above, XXIII 13).

<sup>3</sup>The adhaerent character of  $\sigma\upsilon$  as contradistinguished from  $\mu\eta$ , stoutly denied by Aken, T. u. M. § 234 foll., seems destined to come to honor again. See Hamilton, l. c. As I hinted in the last number, I did not become acquainted with Aken's work until after the war between the States. If I had known his views earlier, I should have had to acknowledge as many obligations as there are coincidences in the results of our studies.

<sup>4</sup>See now S. C. G. § 270, or A. J. P. XV 117 foll.

sense has died without a sign. *οὐ* with the subjunctive, despite its obvious advantages, despite the possibility of fine distinctions between durative and complexive,<sup>1</sup> has given way to *οὐ* with the future, to *οὐκ ἄν* with the optative. It is only in the dependent sentence that the modal meaning reasserts itself. *ἦν μή* with subjunctive cannot keep out *εἰ μή* with future indicative, as *ἔσταν* with subjunctive has kept out *ἔσται* with the future indicative; and the final relative takes the old modal future indicative, which has a variant in the optative with *ἄν*, and which may be represented by the articular future participle, but not by the subjunctive, natural as it seems to those who have been accustomed to make a mechanical parallelism between Latin and Greek subjunctive.<sup>2</sup> All this has become a habit, and when we go back to the earlier world we take our latter-day phrasings with us. When Homer's use differs from standard prose, we feel the shock, but unless we are taught to observe we do not notice the pudencies of Homer, we do not notice the absence of certain familiar prose uses. We have to learn that there was a time when *μή* with the participle was a novelty, as we have to learn that at a late day *μή* with the participle is to be the rule. To us *μή* is the natural negative of the subjunctive and the Homeric *οὐ* with the subjunctive is a sport, so that we read with not a little surprise in an Homeric scholiast that the natural negative of the subjunctive is *οὐ*,<sup>3</sup> and we ask ourselves how such a notion could have entered his foolish brain. Shall we revise our conception of the subjunctive as an imperative? For imperative it is throughout, except when the contrast between *μή* and *οὐ* is brought out by the necessity of a double negative, as in *μή οὐ*. *μή* is the regular negative of the optative of wish, but the potential optative gives us pause; and see how in time the language reconciles itself to *οὐ* with the optative as a representative of the

<sup>1</sup> See now S. C. G. § 386.

<sup>2</sup> How natural it is may be seen from Bäumlein's discussion in his *Untersuchungen*, p. 195. That the Latin relative in so-called final relations is at all events originally potential is one of the points that emerge from the *tohu-bohu* that is preceding the new creation of Latin syntax. This potential (optative with *άν*) conception of the final relative in Latin is put forward in my L. G. of 1872 (§ 632 Rem.), with due caution.

<sup>3</sup> λέγεται ὡς τῶν πέντε ἐγκλίσεων αἱ μὲν δύο ἦγουν ἡ ὀριστικὴ καὶ ὑποτακτικὴ ἔχουσι φυσικὸν τὸ οὐ, αἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἦγουν ἡ προστακτικὴ καὶ εὐκτικὴ καὶ ἀπαρέμφatos τὸ μή. Schol. L on O 41.



indicative. But that is essentially a post-Homeric construction and follows in the wake of *oratio obliqua*. *οὐ* with the infinitive was at one time, as we have seen, an abomination. The Greeks of a later period, the book Greeks, were puzzled by this. The only living optative to them, and a poor life it had, was the optative in wishes, *μή γένοιτο* and the like, and into their imitation of the standard language they slipped an occasional *μή* with *oratio obliqua* optative.<sup>1</sup> The negative of the imperative is *μή*. The mood is kingly and as a king it has long arms and rules large territories of dependencies, yet even there we find variations, even there a stubborn adversative participle refuses obedience, even there we have 'exceptions' that show how the primitive feeling breaks the bonds of conventionality. Nowhere do we feel a sharper thrill than when *οὐ* encroaches on the sphere of the imperative *μή*. In post-Homeric Greek *μή* with the indicative in the dependent sentence is perfectly familiar to us; and we are ready enough with our *μή* in a generic sentence, *μή* in a conditional sense and the like, but to Homer, *μή* with the indicative was a liberty, a liberty due to passion, to hope and fear, to wish and will. The bounds of convention once broken, and Homer goes beyond the limits of classic syntax, and we find in him constructions that remind us of the period of decline, constructions that the scholiasts call by the hard name Alabandic (A. J. P. I 46). At any rate, when these constructions occur in the best period, we are all on hand with our little emendations, we hustle the offending *μή* out of Antiphon with Jebb, we hustle it out of Theognis. We prefer an unnatural stress in the one case, a false sphere in the other. We forget the possible intrusion of passion, a possibility that makes all impossibilities possible.

In all this matter of the negative, the sphere is of especial importance. How small a part does the *μή* of apprehension play in pre-Platonic literature, that *μή* of apprehension, which, like the the Latin *vide ne*, amounts to a cautious assertion. It is not foreign to Homer and yet Homer uses it in a way in which the fear, the apprehension is still felt. In Plato it is little better than a formula, an Homeric construction rising like a lost river in Attic speech,<sup>2</sup> and in later Greek it is used mechanically. But the Platonic use, the later Greek use must not en-

<sup>1</sup> Justin Martyr, Apol. I 26, 21.

<sup>2</sup> See now S. C. G. § 385 or Weber, *Entwicklungsgesch. der Absichtssätze*, p. 192.

courage us to accept an explanation based on the practically positive character of the formula. *οὐ μή* cannot be treated as *οὐ* + positive.<sup>1</sup> The *οὐ* would necessarily rouse the negative element of *μή* into active life and, besides, the history of the independent *μή* itself should teach us caution.

If, however, the tentative *μή* with the subjunctive is old, as we have seen, *οὐ μή* may be as old. The age of the articular infinitive is not to be judged by its emergence in literature, nor the age of *οὐ μή* by its first appearance. Parmenides uses it, but he damns himself thereby as an epic poet as he damns himself by his *μή* with the participle and by the articular infinitive. Professor Lawton, who has no very good opinion of grammarians, says that Parmenides sags in his flight. The grammarian says that he has not the epic wing for the flight. As students of style we need not go into the origin of these things, we need not enter upon analyses at all. To us they are aesthetic elements and we say that *οὐ μή* is a stranger to the earlier literature, to the more aristocratic literature. It is absent from the epos and it is a sin to do what some critics have done and foist it on Pindar's sublimities. We can almost hear the poet saying with his woited aloofness: *ἀφίσταμαι*. In an excited Paionian strain (O. 2, 6), he was guilty of a *-τέον* form, but only once, and in his hot youth he was guilty of a genial Doric articular proper noun (P. 10, 57), but only once. Guilty of *οὐ μή διώξω* (O. 3, 45), never. *οὐ μή* belongs to the dialogue of the wrangling mart; it belongs to the drama, by which, it would seem, so many vulgarities have found their way into classic society. Parmenides was so much in earnest that he forgot himself. That is all. History has no need of it and the orators use it sparingly. The elevation of the *bema* carried with it certain conventionalities which even common creatures like Aischines, if indeed Aischines was a common creature, had to respect. 'Keep your hand snugly within your *himation*,' said to himself the ex-actor of dignitaries.<sup>2</sup> 'Don't point. Don't fling about your articular proper nouns.'<sup>3</sup> Don't make free with *οὐ μή*.' Why, even Demosthenes, who dared everything,

<sup>1</sup> See A. J. P. XVII 516.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ τὴν χεῖρα ἐνδὸν ἔχοντα λέγειν (cf. I, 25) was a part of Aischines' stage *σεμνότης*. See his statue at Naples.

<sup>3</sup> A. J. P. XI 486. Franke's statistic seems to be shamefully inexact. Professor W. K. Clement wrote me at the time that he found 63 cases where Timarchos' name is mentioned, two of them with the article.

is shy of it, and his master Isaios uses it once only, and then in one of those dramatic bits that help to make us understand how he was the fountain of the power of Demosthenes. Turn to the LXX, turn to the New Testament, and in half an hour you will gather up more *οὐ μή*'s than are to be found in all classic literature. It has become the cheap emphasis of a showy race and a degenerate time (A. J. P. XVIII 460, 461). In the same line of degeneracy is the frequent use of *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά* in such writers as Polybios, in the same line the incessant *νῆ Δία* of later essayists, who swear where swearing is out of the question;<sup>1</sup> and it is only by contrast with their exaggerated uses that we learn to appreciate the exquisite reserve of the best period.

As to the other combination *μὴ οὐ*, that is perfectly legitimate after verbs of fear and apprehension, but it has little scope in Homer. It is not overcommon anywhere. It belongs so entirely to momentary needs, to dramatic pressure, that it does not readily pass over into the formulae of the *oratio obliqua*. *μὴ οὐ* with optative expressing *μὴ οὐ* with subjunctive is suspicious. Out of this *μὴ οὐ* with the subjunctive grow the other combinations *μὴ οὐ* with infinitive and participle, Attic constructions which seem to be possible only to the portentous mobility of both the thought and speech of that marvellous strain. It is the Ionic blood that does it. It is the Ionic spirit that does it. And we are not surprised to find it in Herodotos. Modern commentators get their brains muddled and their tongues twisted with *μὴ οὐ*. It was a formula like *quin*, of which perhaps no Roman could have given a rational account; and it may be that the Attics were tangled in their own negatives, though one sooner distrusts one's own skill in unwinding the skein than that of the Attics in winding it. Of course, *μὴ οὐ* became a formula, and was used in later Greek just as any other formula, but in the better times there is always something more than a formula. It is never used except when a problem of practical interest arises, except when there is an *οὐ* of fact or statement to be met by a *μὴ* of will.<sup>2</sup>

The modal particles *ἄν* and *κε(ν)* figure largely in the study of the Greek moods, and as *ἄν* and *κε(ν)* were undoubtedly of different origin, it might be possible to note stylistic differences in the varying use of these particles when they occur side by side as in Homer. The inquiry

<sup>1</sup> Lucian, De conscribenda hist. II 19 R.: *ὅτι γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔστι κὰν ἐπωμοσάμην, εἰ ἀστεῖον ἦν ὄρκον ἐντιθέναί συγγραμμάτι.*

<sup>2</sup> See A. J. P. VII 170.

is a legitimate inquiry, but so far no one has succeeded in differentiating the two throughout to the satisfaction of the world.<sup>1</sup>  $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ , whatever its virtues, is obsolete, is dialectic. In the literature of the Attic time, it is as dead as  $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$ . It belongs to the unreturning past of the epos. It fades out before  $\alpha\nu$  even there, so that in looking over the whole range of Greek we can disregard  $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$  as dialectic and concentrate our attention on  $\alpha\nu$ . Now if we follow the history of  $\alpha\nu$  we find a gradual growth of formulae that remind us of the behavior of 'ever' and 'soever' in English, translations of  $\alpha\nu$  which are something more than translations. In the simple sentence there are particles to which  $\alpha\nu$  nestles close, there are sequences in which  $\alpha\nu$  has its favorite position.  $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa\ \alpha\nu$  with optative runs trippingly from the tongue.  $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}$ , optative with  $\alpha\nu$ , is a harder saying. It is hard to separate  $\alpha\nu$  from the love of the negative, not because the negative is negative but because it is modal. No wonder that it prefers the negative to the infinitive, when one remembers how shy  $\alpha\nu$  was of the infinitive, what a stretch it seemed to carry into *oratio obliqua* the finer shades of *oratio recta*.<sup>2</sup> But it is in the compound sentence that  $\alpha\nu$  shows most clearly this gradual adhaerescence. First in the temporal particles.  $\delta\tau'$   $\alpha\nu$  becomes  $\delta\tau\alpha\nu$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota$   $\alpha\nu$  becomes  $\epsilon\pi\eta\nu$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ .  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\nu$  is born all at once. The original  $\delta\tau\epsilon$  with the subjunctive is after a while allowed no standing room. The temporal particles of limit, 'while', 'until', resist the process longest.  $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$  and  $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$  are found here and there without  $\alpha\nu$ . Like  $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$ , they have rights of finality. 'Until' may carry with it purpose and pure purpose will not have  $\alpha\nu$ . But they too succumb to formula and  $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\ \alpha\nu$  and  $\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \alpha\nu$  alone are orthodox. The relative yields, as the conditional yields, to the encroachment, and distinctions that are still discernible in Homer are swept away in the democratization of the language. We lift our eyebrows and sigh when we find  $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$  with the indicative in later Greek. What else could one expect of a generation of levellers? And then again the old usages reappear in spheres from which they had almost formally been excluded and shock the uniformitarian sense that we all possess to a greater or less degree. So the omission of  $\alpha\nu$  where  $\alpha\nu$  is expected always gives rise to feats of commentatorial agility, and the problem is met in different ways. Sometimes it is set down to the scribe and haplography lends its ready aid to restore

<sup>1</sup>A. J. P. III 446.<sup>2</sup>See A. J. P. XXIII 13.

the missing particle, though the restoration rends our ears by the reduplication of an unaesthetic sound—rends our ears and perhaps unnecessarily, *ἀναγκαίως*, as we might say, as the Greeks would hardly have dared to say. Sometimes when the metre is recalcitrant or there is no reason to suspect the tradition, we see survival, we see a certain self-willed individuality. *εἰ* with subjunctive in tragedy, *ὅς* with subjunctive in tragedy—these are not alien to the epic note which we hear in tragedy, now in vocabulary, now in form. Surely *ὅς* with the subjunctive in tragedy is no worse than the occasional omission of an augment, and *ὅς* with subjunctive in Thukydides is more readily comprehensible than it would be in Isokrates, though hardly acceptable even in Thukydides.<sup>1</sup> Nor are all spheres of *ἄν* to be judged alike, as we have seen in the case of *ἔως* and *πρίν*, where the omission of *ἄν* may have offended the Attic ear as little as an occasional subjunctive would offend our own generation, which seems to be bent on the destruction of a mood that to most people is too vague to serve any useful purpose. And yet so subtle a thing is language that the revival of an old formula may be attended with a new meaning. When *εἰ* with subjunctive revisits the glimpses of the moon, it is not necessarily generic, as we find it in Homer and in Pindar, but it reminds us of the other use of *εἰ* with the subjunctive, the interrogative use, in which *εἰ* with subjunctive is = *εἰ δέ* + infinitive, so that *εἰ* with subjunctive is in tone very much like *εἰ* with future indicative.<sup>2</sup> Hardest of all to admit is the potential optative without *ἄν*. It has its rights in the older language, but when we leave Homer every example is suspicious. The imperative formula provides for most of the few instances, for in the imperative sense optative and optative with *ἄν* meet. Then, again, we say that the key of *ἄν* may dominate a long complex and if *ἄν* is found in the preceding sentence the situation is relieved. Euphony, as has already been hinted, may be at work. The repetition of syllables was an abomination to the Greek ear, and we, who take such liberties with the double sibilant in the possessive case, ought for justice' sake to be charitable to omission of *ἄν* in poetry or in carefully articulated prose. In Pindar's famous *οὐ ξείναν ἰκοίμαν γαίαν*

<sup>1</sup> See the commentators on 4, 17, 2: *οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι*, which sounds like a proverb in ischiorrhogic metre.

<sup>2</sup> Transactions of Am. Phil. Ass., 1876, p. 8.

ἄλλων (P. 4, 118), there are -ων's enough and to spare. And yet there are unannealed optatives still left to torture the grammatical soul with 'remote deliberatives' and the like. By the student of aesthetics all these adherences to an obsolete type, all these departures from established formulae are to be regarded as so many notes of style; and our critical conclusions must be swayed in a large measure by the character of the author, the character of the department.

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